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Abstract: This Article outlines two versions of cyberlaw, The first,
characteristic of the scholarship of the late 1990s, is typified by a
borclerless Internet and national laws that cease to have effect at their
real-space borders, the regulatory power of code, and the virtue of self-
regulatory solutions to Internet and e-commerce issues. In Cybet'law 2.0,
the borderless Internet becomes bordered, bordered laws become
borderless. the regulation of code becomes regulated code, and self-
regulation becomes industry consultation, as government shifts toward
a more traditional regulatory approach. The Article assesses each of
these changes, calling attention to recent developments in copyright
law, domain name dispute resolution, privacy, and Internet governance.
At the heart of each is the question of the appropriate governmental
role in Internet regulation and the need for cyberlaw to reconcile how
government and regulation fit within the tensions of ever-changing
technologies.
The private sector should lead. Though government played a role in
financing the initial development of the Internet, its expansion has been
driven primarily by the private sector: For electronic commerce to flourish,
the private sector must continue to lead.
—President William" Clinton and Vice President Albert Gore, Jr.,
Framework for Global Electronic Commerce, October 1997 1
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INTRODUCTION
The 1990s was a time of unlimited possibility for the Internet.
Fuelled by the seemingly insatiable appetite for anything "cyber," the
globe was abuzz over the new economy and the race to replace bricks
with clicks. From e-conunerce to e-mail, the Internet stood ready to
transform society's commercial and communications fabric.
For many, the Internet was also primed to create a sea-change in
the law, with many maintaining that fitting traditional regulatory
mechanisms into the online environment was the equivalent of
squeezing a square peg into a round hole. Governments around the
world became early adherents to this belief. Citing the convergence of
borderless networks, laws that ended at national borders, and the
regulatory power of computer code, governments willingly yielded
Internet policy development to private-sector-led, self-regulatory ini-
tiatives. 2
Today the Internet still represents a medium of great potential
but the shine is clearly off the apple. The dot-com crash has led to a
reexamination of the impact of the Internet, with many now acknowl-
edging that the opportunity to purchase pet food or CDs online does
not a revolution make. 3
 For many companies and consumers, the
Internet is a supplement—not a replacement—to their daily commer-
cial and communication activities.
And what of cyberlaw? It too is undergoing a reevaluation as the
new challenges of Internet regulation may not be as insurmountable
as we had been led to believe. Version 1.0 of cyberlaw is rapidly giving
way to version 2.0, and with it, the emphasis is shifting from a border-
less network to borderless law, from code that regulates to code that is
regulated, and from self-regulation to government regulation.
This Article explores these two versions of cyberlaw. It argues that.
we must take note of this metamorphosis because it provides clear
signs of the future of Internet regulation. At the core of this examina-
tion of cyberlaw is the role of government in the online world.
Whether government is characterized as a willing bystander, a power-
less policymaker, or a proactive regulatory force that knows no
boundaries, cyberlaw must reconcile how government and regulation
fit within the tensions of ever-changing technologies.
2 See Clinton & Gore, supra note 1.
3 See Miguel Helft, Dog Days for Pet Sites, STANDARD, Jun, 12, 2000, at http://mmtlte
stantlard.com/article/display/0,1151,15692,00.110111.
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I. CYBERLAW 1.0
A, Borderless Internet, Bordered Laws
Although no single event or work can lay claim to capturing the
early essence of cyberlaw, one e-mail comes close. John Perry Barlow's
e-mail, known as the "Declaration of the Independence of Cyber-
space,"4 served as a clarion call for a new regulatory approach to the
Internet, and gave a voice to thousands of "netizens" who watched
with increasing anxiety as seemingly overnight the Internet was trans-
formed into a commercial, regulated space. Barlow penned his decla-
ration one clay after the U.S. Congress enacted the Communications
Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 5 the first national U.S. attempt at Inter-
net content regulation. Although relatively unremarkable by today's
standards, the CDA galvanized the Internet community into action,
culminating with the 1997 U.S. Supreme Court ruling that declared
the CDA unconstitutional.6 Barlow's declaration left little doubt about
his view of the appropriate role for government in cyberspace:
Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of
flesh and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of
Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave
us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sover-
eignty where we gather .... Governments derive their just
powers from the consent of the governed. You have neither
solicited nor received ours. We did not invite you. You do not
know us, nor do you know our world. Cyberspace does not
lie within your borders.?
The Barlow declaration was soon followed by what is likely the
most cited cyberlaw article yet written: David Post and David John-
John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (Feb. 8, 1996),
at http://www.eff.org/—Barlow/Declamation-Final.ht ml.
5 Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.).
6 Sec Reno v. ACLU. 521 U.S. 844. 874 (1997) (holding the CDA lacked the precision
required by the First Amendment to regulate the content of speech); Electronic Privacy
Information Center, EPIC Hails Supreme Court Internet "Indecency" Decision: Opinion
?reserves Both Free Speech And Personal Privacy" (June 26, 1997) (noting that "EPIC
joined with the American Civil Liberties Union and 18 other plaintiffs in challenging the
law on February 8, 1996, the day it was signed by President Clinton"), at
http://www2.epic.org/cdn/epic_sup_st_statement.html.
7 Barlow, supra note 4.
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son's Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace. 8 The Post and
Johnson article added legal clout to the passion of the Barlow declara-
tion, positing that cyberspace was cut off from the rule-making institu-
tions of the physical world.9 The authors argued that geographic,
physical borders are a necessary precondition for effective and legiti-
mate law making because it is within those borders that rules are en-
forced and legitimated by the general public.") They maintained that
the Internet undermines this dynamic, suggesting that it operates in-
dependent of real space and with no identifiable borders." Given this
dilemma, Post and Johnson advocated considering cyberspace as a
separate "place," governed by its own legal framework." The sole
border would be one dividing the virtual from the physical; by enter-
ing cyberspace, a person would literally enter a new jurisdiction." The
inhabitants would govern this new space, and the authors advocated a
decentralized, self-regulatory model in which Internet users created
rules best suited to their needs."
Although the Post and Johnson article generated immediate
challenges from some scholars with many dismissing the "cyberspace
as a place" school of thought, 15 the belief in the virtually insurmount-
able legal complications created by bordered laws mapped onto a
borderless Internet became a truism amongst many observers.' 6 In
fact, many courts accepted this notion, which is reflected by the reluc-
tance to even consider the possibility of mapping geographic borders
to the online world. For example, in American Library Ass'n v. Pataki, a
See generally David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyber-
space, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996).
9 See id.
I° Id. at 1368-70.
" Id. at 1370.
12 Id. at 1378-81,
"Johnson & Post, supra note 8,1379.
" Id. at 1379-81, Post and Johnson have revisited and enhanced their proposal for
rule-making in cyberspace, See generally David R. Johnson & David G. Post, And How Shall
the Net Be Governed? A Mediation on the Relative Virtues of Decentralized, Emergent Law, in Co-
ORDINATING 'I10E INTERNET 62 (Brian Kahin & James Keller eds., 1997). Post has also dis-
cussed the advantages of rule-making by those using the Internet. See David G, Post, Attar-
chy, State and the Internet: An Essay on Law-Making in Cyberspace, 1995 J. ONLINE L. art. 3, par.
4, at 20-27.
15 See. e.g., Jack Goldsmith, Against Cyberartarehy, 65 U. Cnt. L. REV. 1199, 1200-01
(1998).
" See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization ofJurisdiction, 151 U. PA, L. REV. 311,
314-17 (2002); Adria Allen, Comment, Internet Jurisdiction Today, 22 Nw. J. Irret. L. & Bus.
69,69-70 (2001); Timothy B. Nagy, Comment, Personal Jurisdiction and cyberspace: Establish-
ing Precedent in a Boalerless Era, 6 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 101, 101 (1998).
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Commerce Clause challenge to a New York state law targeting Inter-
net content classified as obscene, the court characterized geography
on the Internet in the following manner:
The Internet is wholly insensitive to geographic distinc-
tions. In almost every case, users of the Internet neither
know nor care about the physical location of the Internet re-
sources they access. Internet protocols were designed to ig-
nore rather than document geographic location; while com-
puters on the network do have "addresses," they are logical
addresses on the network rather than geographic addresses
in real space. The majority of Internet addresses contain no
geographic clues and, even where an Internet address pro-
vides such a clue, it may be misleading."
B. The Regulatory Power of Code
The second defining principle of cyberlaw was the regulatory
power of code—that is, "how the software and hardware that makes
cyberspace what it is regulate cyberspace as it is." 18 Although Law-
rence Lessig is most closely associated with this principle, due in large
measure to his seminal work, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace," others
such as Joel Reidenberg were also early advocates. 20 As Lessig argued
in one of his early pieces, The Constitution of Code,
ode ... regulates behavior in cyberspace. The code, or
the software that makes cyberspace as it is, constitutes a set of
constraints on how one can behave in cyberspace. The sub-
stance of these constraints vary, but. they are experienced as
conditions on one's access to cyberspace. In some places,
one must enter a password before one gains access; in other
places, one can enter whether identified or not. In some
places, the transactions that one engages produce traces that.
link the transactions (the mouse droppings) back to the in-
dividual; in other places, this link is achieved only if one
wants. In some places, one can select to speak a language
that. only the recipient can hear (through encryption); in
17 969 F. Stipp. 100, 170-71 (S.D.N.I: 1997).
18 LAWRENCE USSR:, CODE AND OTIIER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (1999).
19 See generally id.
" SeeJoel R. Reidenberg, Governing Networks and Rule-Making in Cyberspace, in BORDERS
IN CYBERSPACE 84 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., 1997)
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other places encryption is not an option. The code or soft-
ware or architecture or protocols set these features; they are
features selected by code writers; they constrain some behav-
ior by making other behavior possible, or impossible. They
too are regulations. 21
Lessig's argument, developed in several other articles prior to the
release of Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, 22 noted that not only could
technology influence the regulatory framework, but that it could be
the regulatory framework. 23 Reidenberg also called attention to the
power of technology, suggesting that traditional American and Euro-
pean approaches to regulatory policy making are ineffective when
applied to the Internet. 24 Instead, Reidenberg noted that "a network
governance paradigm must emerge to recognize the complexity of
regulatory power centers, [and] utilize new policy instruments such as
technical standardization to achieve regulatory objectives."25
Lessig identified not only the power of the underlying computer
code, but foreshadowed the next stage of cyberlaw development: the
need for government to "harness" it 26 In Code and Other Laws of Cyber-
space, Lessig claimed that "not only can the government take ... steps
to reassert its power to regulate, but that it should. Government
should push the architecture of the Net to facilitate its regulation, or
else it will suffer what can only be described as a loss of sovereign ty." 27
C. The Virtue of Selfliegulation
In the late 1990s, Lessig's call for government to regulate code
went largely unheeded. Buoyed by the perceived potential of e-
commerce and claims that governmental intervention would serve
only to stifle the development of the Internet, governments were gen-
erally all too happy to adopt self-regulatory frameworks that left policy
leadership to the private sector. For example, on July 1, 1997, Presi-
dent Clinton released a report entitled Framework for Global Electronic
2] Lawrence Lessig, The Constitution of Code: Limitations on Clwiee-Based Critiques of Cyber-
space Regulation, 5 COM M LAW CONSPECTUS 181,183 (1997) (citations omitted).
22 See generally Lawrence Lessig, Constitution and Code, 27 Cunut. L. REv. 1 (1996-97);
Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 blow,' L.J. 869 (1996); Lawrence
Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403 (1996) [hereinafter Lessig, Zones].
23 See Liss IG, supra note 18, at 6.
24 Sec Reidenberg, supra note 20, at 96-95,100,
25 Id. at 96-100.
26 See ',ESSIG, supra note 18, at 231-34.
27 Id. at 199.
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Commerce, articulating guiding policy principles, including private sec-
tor leadership; avoidance of undue governmental restrictions on e-
commerce; the enforcement of a predictable, minimalist, consistent,
and simple legal environment for commerce; the recognition of the
unique qualities of the Internet; and the facilitation of electronic
commerce on a global basis. 28
 The European Union declaration, re-
leased one week after the U.S. framework, followed the United States'
lead and called for, among other things, a key role for the private sec-
tor, the development of a clear and predictable regulatory framework,
and the recognition of the special characteristics and fundamentally
transnational nature of the Internet. 29
Not surprisingly, global corporations encouraged the self-
regulatory approach. For example, the Global Business Dialogue on
E-Commerce (GBDe), an e-commerce corporate policy and lobbying
group with dozens of multinational corporations among its member-
ship, maintained,
[1] he pace and scope of change requires business to play
a leadership role in working with governments, governmen-
tal organizations, business groups, consumer organizations
and other stakeholders to develop an effective e-commerce
framework that is global, market-driven and flexible.... [E]-
commerce policy solutions should be market-driven and
based on industry self-regulation wherever possible.
... Conventional regulatory structures seem to be less ca-
pable of coping with the challenges of converging markets.
The GBDe believes priority must be given to self-regulation
and policy cooperation rather than over-regulation. Only in
providing for continued market dynamism will a policy
framework enable the converging process to realize its full
potential, as well as allowing electronic commerce to reap
the largest benefit from the convergence melting pot."
29 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
29 See Ministerial Declaration from European Ministerial Conference (Bonn, Ger-
many), Global Information Networks: Realising the Potential (July 6-8, 1997) (hereinafter
Ministerial Declaration], at http:/ europa.eint/ISPO/lbonn /Min _declaration/ iiinalen.
him!.
30 GLOBAL Bus. DIALOGUE ON ELEC. COMMERCE, GBDE 2000 BROCHURE 2, 7 (hereinaf-
ter GBDE 2000 BROCHURE} (on file with the author). Current information on the GBDe is
available at http://www.gbde.org
 (last visited Mar. 2003).
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Even with the most contentious policy matters, governments fre-
quently seemed willing to oblige industry and the private sector. The
Deputy Chairman of Australia's Broadcast Authority, one of the few
government agencies among Organisation for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development (OECD) member states actively to enforce an
online content regulatory framework, 31 noted in a 1998 speech,
It is clear that there is a broad level of international consen-
sus emerging about some basic principles for the governance
of cyberspace. These have been articulated in North Amer-
ica, Europe and the Asia Pacific region, including Australia
.... The use of the terminology "Legal Framework for Cy-
berspace" might best be avoided, carrying as it does unnec-
essary and inappropriate overtones of heavy-handed inter-
ference, when what is really being proposed is simply a body
of broad principles largely based on the notion of interna-
tional cooperation, national responsibility and industry self-
regulation . 32
Similarly, the European Commission, in conjunction with the Euro-
pean Parliament and the European Council—bodies not known for
regulatory reticence—developed an overtly self-regulatory "Action
Plan" in 1997.33
" See Gareth Grainger, Freedom of Expression and Regulation of Information in Cy-
berspace: Issues Concerning Potential International Cooperation Principles for Cyber-
space, Address Before the UNESCO International Congress, INFOEthics '98: Ethical, Le-
gal and Societal Challenges of Cyberspace and Expert Meeting on Cyberspace Law 15-21
(Sept. 1, 1998) (transcript available at hup://www.aba.gov.au/abanews/speeches/online_
serv/pdfrtf/ggmon98.pdf).
32 Id. at 44.
33 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council,
the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Action Plan on
Promoting Safe Use of the Internet (Nov. 26, 1997), at hup://www.midas.gr/info2000/
lab/internetact.doc (last modified Feb. 17, 2000).
As noted by the Communication:
The European Parliament has stated the need for self-regulation and urged
Member States and the Commission to promote co-operation among industry
(access and service providers), political decision-makers and users' associa-
tions.
The Council requested Member States to encourage and facilitate self-
regulatory systems including representative bodies for Internet service pro-
viders and users, effective codes of conduct and hot-line reporting mecha-
nisms available to the public. The Commission was requested to foster co-
ordination at Community level of self-regulatory and representative bodies
and promote and facilitate the exchange of information on best practice in
this area.
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Implicit in emerging cyberlaw principles was the limited role for
government in the regulation of the Internet. 34 The borderless Inter-
net perspective suggested that traditional governmental organizations
lacked the moral authority to exert. regulatory control over the online
environment because the relationship between citizen and state
changed dramatically given the ability for the "governed" to move
freely between online spaces without regard to national borders."
With the reach of national laws ending at national borders, the right
of states to regulate online conduct, which frequently occurred out,
side national borders, was diminished.
Proponents of regulatory code argued that government was in-
creasingly powerless to regulate the online environment. In the battle
between East. Coast Code (traditional regulation, which directs behav-
ior) and West Coast Code (regulation, by the software code, of cyber-
space), initially West Coast Code would prevail, leaving government
without its customary methodology for regulating online behavior."
Although Lessig acknowledged that government could seek to regu-
late code, he maintained that its ability to do so was directly related to
the type of code or architecture of the Internet in question; thus,
open source code is far less regulable than proprietary software
code . 37
Advocates of self-regulation promoted the view that government
was an inefficient and ineffective regulator of the online environ-
ment. This was a vision of government as too slow and too removed
from the realities of the Internet marketplace—in a sense too Lud-
In the Bonn Declaration, ministers stressed the role which the private sector
can play in protecting the interests of consumer's and in promoting and re-
specting ethical standards, through properly-functioning systems of self-
regulation in compliance with and supported by the legal system.
Id. (citations omitted), See Ministerial Declaration, supra note 29, for the Bonn Declara-
tion referenced above.
Sec Barlow. supra note 4.
35 Sec LEsstG, supra note 18, at 190-91.
36 Sec M. at 53, 99, 220-21. East Coast Code has been so-named because in the United
States much of traditional regulation originates in liVashington, D.C.; the tax code is an
example of such traditional regulation. Id. at 53. West Coast Code, on the other hand,
references the regulation of behavior by the "instructions imbedded in the software and
hardware that make cyberspace work." Id. Software and hardware code generally originate
front programmers located on the West Coast of the United States. Id.
37 Sec id. at 107. For an explanation of open source software, see Marshall Brain, What
Does Open Source Mean?, HowStuffWorks.corn, at hup://computer.howstuffworks.com/
question435.1nin (last visited Mar. 24, 2003) (noting that with open source software, the
source code to the software is readily available, which allows for modification and customi-
zation).
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dite—to regulate effectively. 38 Far better, self-regulation advocates
would argue, to allow those parties who "get it to set the rules uncon-
strained by government and guided by self-interest and the market. 39
II. CYBERLAW 2.0
Government may have been willing to step aside during the
commercial Internet's nascent years, but no longer. With every aspect
of the Internet regulatory environment undergoing renewed analysis,
the next generation of cyberlaw looks to be dramatically different
from its predecessor. In Cyberlaw 2.0, the borderless Internet be-
comes bordered, bordered laws become borderless, the regulation of
code becomes regulated code, and self-regulation becomes industry
consultation, as government shifts toward a more traditional regula-
tory approach. This vision of cyberlaw exacerbates competing policy
tensions, pitting government against government, government against
industry, and government against citizen.
A. Bordered Internet, Borderless Laws
I. Bordered Internet
The vision of a borderless Internet riding roughshod over laws
that stop at national borders may have captured the imagination of
many in the Internet community in the mid-1990s, 4° but today it has
become increasingly clear that the reverse may actually be true. Sup-
ported by businesses unwilling to abandon longstanding business
models based on traditional geographic borders, several companies
are rapidly creating new tools that allow for effective (though imper-
fect) geographic identification on the Internet. Governments, mean-
while, unwilling to concede that national laws are limited to national
borders, are increasingly turning to explicitly extra-territorial legisla-
tion.
The result is an emerging legal framework that threatens the na-
tional sovereignty of many smaller countries, though not for reasons
one would expect. Version 1.0 of cyberlaw was highlighted by the in-
ability to enforce national laws against activities with local effects oc-
curring outside the jurisdiction, which served as the primary threat to
38 See Donna Wentworth, Deadline Time, FILTER 1.3 (1998), at http://cyber.law.harvarcl.
edn/filter/100198/ifwp.httn1.
" See GBDE 2000 BROCHURE, supra note 30, at 3, 4.
40 See generally Johnson & Post, supra note 8.
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national sovereignty. In version 2.0, the greater challenge is proving to
be aggressive extra-territorial statutes that hamper states' ability to
enforce national law and policy inside the jurisdiction.
Because both business and government share a vested interest in
bringing geographic borders to the online environment (albeit for
different reasons), it should come as little surprise that technologies
facilitating geographic identification have so quickly arrived onto the
marketplace. Although critics often point to the inaccuracy of these
technologies,41 few users of the technology actually require perfec-
tion. 42 Businesses either want to target their message to consumers in
a specific geographic area or to engage in "jurisdictional avoidance, "43
Governments, on the other hand, often want to engage in geographic
identification so that they can more easily identify when laws are trig-
gered. For example, the State of Nevada recently enacted legislation
that paves the way for the Nevada State Gaining Commission to legal-
ize online gambling." Jurisdictional identification is central to the
new legislation:
The commission may not adopt regulations governing the li-
censing and operation of interactive gaming until the com-
mission first determines that:
(a) Interactive gaming can be operated in compliance
with all applicable laws;
(b) Interactive gaming systems are secure and reliable,
and provide reasonable assurance that players will be of law-
ful age and communicating only from jurisdictions where it
is lawful to make such commun ications. 45
Sec Information Technology Association of America, E-Commerce Taxation and the
Limitations of Geolocation Tools, at http://www.itaa.org/taxfinance/dots/geolocationpa-
per.pdf (last visited Jan. 30. 2003).
42 See Mick jesdanun, The Potential and Peril of National Internet Boundaries, S.F. EXAM-
INER, Mar. 4, 2001, available at http://www.examiner.com/bnsiness/default.jsp?story=  b.
net.0107. Following from economic theory, Lessig noted that "[al regulation need not be
absolutely effective to be sufficiently effective." See Lessig, Zones, supra note 22, at 1405. The
same applies to bordering technologies: whether used for targeted marketing or to ensure
legal compliance, it need not be perfect. See id.
43 See Stephanie Olsen, Tracking Web Users into European Territory. CNLT NEWS.COM , Apr.
3, 2001, at http://ne%vs.com.cotn/2100-1023-836361.1itml; Bob Tedeschi, E-Commerre: Bor-
dem Returning to the Internet, NATINIES.COM , Apr. 2, 2001, at littp://www.nytimes.com/2001/
04/02/technology/02ECOMMERCE.html.
44 Renters, Nevada Governor Signs Online Gambling Bill, CASINO Grim' NEWS1,-, June 19-
25, 2001, at http://newsletter.casinocity.com/Issue41.
45 2001 Nev. Stat. 3075, 3076.
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Geographic identification has actually been utilized on the
Internet on a relatively primitive scale for some time. For example,
Internet Protocol (IP) lookups, which determine approximate user
locations by referencing the user's IP address against databases listing
Internet. Service Provider (ISP) server locations, had been used by
Microsoft until last year to comply with U.S. regulations prohibiting
the export of strong-encryption Web browser software.4° Although
imperfect, the process was viewed as sufficiently effective to meet the
standards imposed by the regulations.47
Recently; several companies have begun offering more sophisti-
cated versions of these technologies. Akamai, an e-business service
and software provider, provides a geographic identification service
called EdgeScape, which maps user IP addresses to their geographic
location and network point of origin. 48 This information is then as-
sembled into a database and made available to EdgeScape customers.
Each time a user accesses a client's Web site, EdgeScape provides data
detailing the country from which the user is accessing the site, the
geographic region within that country (i.e., state or province), and
the name of the user's origin network.49 Similarly; Quova, a California-
based company, has developed GeoPoint, which boasts ninety-eight.
percent accuracy in determining Web users' country of origin and
eighty-five percent accuracy when drilling down to the city leve1. 50
Businesses are implementing these technologies with increasing
frequency as they seek to replicate offline business models online. For
example, CinemaNow Inc., a California-based online distributor of
feature-length films, uses the technology to limit distribution of the
films to ensure compliance with distribution-license agreements that
46 Sce Jesdantin, supra note 42; sec also Jeff Tyson. How Internet Infrastructure Works, at
http://comptiterhowstuffworks.com/internet-infrastructure.htm (last visited Mar. 24,
2003) (overview of' how the Internet works).
47 Sec id.
413 For the company's Web site, see Akamai.com ; for company facts and figures. see
hup://www.akanialconi/en/html/ahout/facts_figures.html (last Visited Mar. 2003). For
information on Akamai's Edgescape offering, see Products & Services. Edgescape, at
littp://www.akamai.com/en/litml/services/edgescape.hmil (last visited Jan. 30, 2003).
as Edgescape can identify a customer's physical location (country, region, city, area
code, zip code, etc.), network (connection type, e.g., dial-up; network name, e.g., AOL;
actual connection speed), and corporate identity (company name, domain name). Sec
How It Works, Akaini, at hup://svww.altantalcont/en/html/services/edge_how_it_works.
hunt (last visited Jan. 30, 2003).
50 SeeStephanie Olsen, Tracking 1(-b Users into European Territoor. CNET Nuws.cosi. Apr.
3, 2001, at htip://news.com ,com/2100-1023-836361.html. For Quota's product descrip-
tion, see GeoPoint, at littp://ssww.quova.corniclescription/services/geopoint.html (last
visited Jan. 30, 2003).
2003]	 Cyber Law 2.0	 335
vary by country." Similarly, Internet users accessing Movielink.com , a
U.S. Internet movie rental Web site, who are identified as coining
from outside the United States are advised that the site is not available
to non-U.S. residents and denied further access to the Web site. 52
Even Google, the world's most popular search engine, has acknowl-
edged using these technologies to meet. variations in local laws by de-
livering different. search results to users in different countries. 53
The power to map geography onto the Internet calls into ques-
tion claims of a borderless Internet. Although many Internet. users do
indeed experience a "borderless" Internet as they effortlessly visit sites
worldwide at the click of a mouse, users themselves are not borderless.
They are located in physical places that with increasing frequency can
be identified by the Web sites they visit. As Web sites filter content or
alter user experiences based on geographic origin, they begin the
process of bordering the Internet. 54 Although previously the same
network for all users whether accessed in Atlanta or Auckland, the
Internet is fast becoming a bordered medium that varies noticeably
depending upon geographic location of the user.
2. Borderless Laws—Copyright
Although the bordered Internet. deservedly garners increasing
attention, the emergence of borderless digital laws deserves even
greater scrutiny. Copyright law, for instance, though typically re-
garded as national legislation, is increasingly being extended beyond
national borders. The case of Dimitri Sklyarov, a Russian software
programmer, and his employer, Elcomsoft, illustrates the explicitly
Sec Patricia Jacobus, CinemaNary Appeases Studios By Locating 'Web  Surfers, CNET
NEws.com , Feb. 26, 2001, at http://news.com.com/2100.1023-253169.html.
52
 Sec Movielink, at http://www.movielink ,com (last visited Mar. 2003). Presently, the
ternis of use include the following:
11. NON-UNITED STATES RESIDENTS. The Services are available only to
customers located in the United States of America, excluding its territories. If
you are outside of the United States of America, kindly refrain from using the
Services. Movielink makes no representation that the Services and any con-
tent or products offered on the Services and their copyrights, trademarks,
patents, and licensing arrangements, are appropriate or available for use in
locations other than in the United States at America.
Terms of Use, Movielink, at http://www.inovielink.com/cominerce/help/terms.jhuni (last
visited Mar. 24. 2003).
55 See Declan McCullagh, Google Excluding Controversial Sites, CNET NEws.con, Oct. 23,
2002. of littp://news.com.com/2100-1023-963132.1ttml.
54 Sec. e.g., Tedeschi, supra note 43.
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extra-territorial nature of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA), the flagship U.S. digital copyright statute.55
Sklyarov, the author of a software program that undermined the
encryption used by Adobe in its e-book software, visited Las Vegas,
Nevada in July 2001 to present a paper on the strengths and weak-
nesses of software used to protect electronic books. 56 When Adobe
became aware of his planned appearance, it approached the FBI to
seek its intervention into the matter. 57
 Armed with information from
the company about the piracy potential of the software program, the
FBI prepared an arrest warrant and detained Skylarov after he deliv-
ered his conference presentation. 58
Spurred by Skylarov's arrest, the global online community mobi-
lized into action. A "Boycott Adobe" Web site was hastily constructed
outlining how Skylarov's software program featured many legitimate
uses, such as the ability to make backup copies of e-books or to read e-
books on other devices owned by the same user. 59 Software program-
mers voiced their concern, indicating that the arrest would make
many think twice before visiting the United States Lest they suffer the
same fate as Skylarov (who faced up to twenty-five years in prison, and
fines up to $2.25 million).60 Civil liberties groups also became in-
volved, organizing protests at Adobe's offices and expressing dismay
that it had become a criminal offense under U.S. copyright law merely
to distribute information about a device that could be used to break
technology protecting digital copyright. 61
After a month in jail, Sklyarov was released on bail; charges were
later dropped against Sklyarov, but charges remained against his em-
55 See generally Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 286
(1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C); Reuters, Copyright Bill Clears Congress,
WIRED NEWS, Oct. 12, 1998, at http://www.wirecl ,corninews/politics/0,1283,15571.00.
html.
56
 Declan McCtillagh, Russian Adobe Hacker Busted, WittEn NEws, July 17, 2001, at
http://tvww.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,45298,00.html.
57
 Declan McCullagh, Hacker Arrest Stirs Protest, WIRED NEws, July 19, 2001, at
http;/ /wsm.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,45342,00.html.
56 Id.; McCullagh, supra note 56.
59 See Background & Status, at http://wtvw.freesklyarov.org  (last visited Jan. 31, 2003).
69
 See Michelle Delio, Russian Hacker Charges Dropped, WIRED NEWS, Dec. 13, 2001, at
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,49122,00.html;  Robert Lentos, Copyright Act
Gags Programmers, ZDNET UK NEWS, Sept. 7, 2001, at http://news.zdnet.co.uk/story/
0,3269-s2094786,00.html.
61 Adobe &Book Hacker Released, WIRED NEws, Aug. 6, 2001, at http://wtsw.wired.
com/news/politics/0,1283,45870,00.html;
 Electronic Frontier Foundation, Free Dmitryl
What You Can Do To Help Set Dmitry Sklyarov Free, Action Alert (July 17. 2001), at
http://ww.efLorg/alerts/20010719_eff
 sklyarov_alert.html.
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player, Elcomsoft (which faced fines up to $500,000). 62 Elcomsoft's
first legal response was to file a motion to dismiss on the grounds that.
they represented an extra-territorial application of U.S. copyright law
against a Russian company that had acted in accordance with its own
national law.63 The motion argued,
[Allthough the importance of regulating the activities pro-
hibited under section 1201 may be significant to the United
States, application of the law is not consistent with the tradi-
tions of the international system, as its application to a for-
eign corporation for activities that occurred in cyberspace
would conflict with the laws of Russia. Elcomsoft is a Russian
company that conducted its activities consistent with the laws
of that country. Russian law permits the development and
sale of the AEBPR [Advanced eBook Processor) program. If
this court were to find that it has jurisdiction over Elcomsoft.
pursuant to an alleged violation of section 1201 of title 17 of
the United States Code, this court would be subjecting El-
comsoft to a law that conflicts with the regulations of an-
other sovereignty."
Although presiding Judge Ronald M. Whyte denied the defense
motion to dismiss, finding that the conduct in question occurred in
the United States, 65 the response brief from the U.S. Attorney's Office
62 Defense Motion to Dismiss Indictment for Lack of jurisdiction at 17-18, United
States v. Elcom, No. CR 01-20183 RMW (N.D. Cal. filed .011.14, 2002) [hereinafter Defense
Motion], available at http://www.efLorg/IP/DMCA/US_v_Elcomsoft/20020114_elcom_
dismiss jnris_inotion.pdf; Farhad Manjoo & Michelle Delio, Adobe Hackers: War Immune,
WIRED Nt:ws, Mar. 4, 2002. at http://wwv.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,50797,00.html .
On December 17, 2002, a federal jury acquitted Elcomsoft on all criminal charges. Press
Release, Electronic Frontier Foundation, jury Acquits Elcomsoft in ebook Copyright Case
(Dec. 17, 2002). at lutp://mnstw.efforg/IP/DMCA/US_v_Elcomsoft/20021217_eff pr.
him!.
63 Defense Motion, supra note 62, at 17-18; Manjoo & Delio. supra note 62.
63 Defense Motion, supra note 62, at 16-17.
66 United States V. Elcom, No, CR 01-20138 RMW (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2002) (order de-
nying Defense motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction), available at
http://www.eff,org/IP/DMCA/US v Elcomsoft/20020327_dismiss_deny_order.litml.
The court noted in the judgment:
The court need not reach the issue of whether the Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act has extraterritorial application because the trafficking conduct for
which defendants have been charged occurred in the United States. The
conduct which underlies the indictment includes Elcomsoft's offering its
AEBPR program for sale over the in ternet, from a computer server physically
located in the United States. Purchasers obtained copies of the program in
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is instructive.% It argued that the plain language of the DMCA clearly
applies extra-territorially, noting that section 1201 (b), the section at
issue, states that it is unlawful to "manufacture, import, offer to the
public, provide, or otherwise traffic in any technology, product, serv-
ice, device, component, or part thereof." 67 According to the U.S. At,
torney's Office, the inclusion of the word "import" within the statute
demonstrates "Congress' intent to extend the DMCA beyond the bor-
ders of the United States."° 8
The Elcomsoft jurisdictional issues are not an anomaly—in fact,
the DMCA regularly influences behavior outside the borders of the
United States, often to the consternation of other countries. 69 For ex-
ample, Canada is currently engaged in a digital copyright reform pro-
cess that is considering how to implement the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) copyright treaties into national legis-
lation." As part of the reform process, Industry Canada and Canadian
Heritage, the two ministries jointly responsible for Canadian copy-
right policy, sponsored a cross-country consultation involving "town
hall" meetings in various cities across Canada in the spring of 2002. 71
At the Ottawa meeting in March 2002, U.S.-based direct-to-home
satellite provider DirecTV gave a detailed presentation on the re-
sponse rate of Canadian ISPs to its DMCA "notice and takedown" no-
the United States. A copy of the program was sold to a purchaser in Califor-
nia. Payments were directed to, and received by, an entity in the United
States.
There is sufficient conduct occurring within the United States for there to be
subject matter jurisdiction over this matter on a territorial basis.
Id.
66 See Government Opposition to Defense Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction at
10-12, United States v. Elcom, No. CR 01-20183 RMIV (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 8, 2002) (on
file with author).
67 Id. at 10.
68 Id.
69 See Mau Loney, ISPs Buckle Under Copyright Cases, ZDNet UK News, Dec. 10, 2002, at
http://news.zciet.co.tik/story/0,4269-s2 I 27279,00.html (Although anyone can demand
the take-down of allegedly infringing material. an ISPs removal of content is "not a simple
process" and can leave the "ISPs open to legal action," both "from the person giving notice
and from their customers.").
70 See GOVT OF CAN„ SUPPORTING CULTURE AND INNOVATION: REPORT ON 	 PROVI-
SIONS AND OPERATION OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT, at iv, 43-44 (Oct. 2002), available at
h ttp://strategis.ic.gc.ca/pics/rp/section 92eng.pdf.
71 See Government of Canada, Consultation Meetings on Digital Copyright Issues, at
http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/rp00838e.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2002).
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tifications, 72 DirecTV lamented that "only" forty-three percent of Ca-
nadian 1SPs responded to its requests to remove content, seemingly
oblivious to the fact that many Canadians might find it problematic
that even one percent of ISPs, much less forty-three percent, would
respond to legal requests that did not reflect Canadian copyright law
or policy." The response rate did not surprise many Canadian ISPs,
however, who privately acknowledged that they had little alternative
but to respond, lest they face the prospect of significant liability for
copyright infringement in the United States.
Much the same issue arose in Australia in early 2003. At least one
Australian ISP received a demand letter from MecliaForce, a U.S. digi-
tal copyright solutions company acting on behalf of Warner Bros.,
which listed several IP addresses it claimed were used illegally to ac-
cess copyrighted material. 74 The letter proceeded to demand that the
users of the JP addresses be denied access and that their accounts be
terminated. 75
Digital copyright issues have proven to be the most contentious
cyberlaw policy matter. Content creators, led by the movie and music
industries, have sought greater control over their content in response
to concerns over global piracy facilitated by the Internet. Despite
widespread agreement on the importance of the issue, there is no
consensus on the appropriate policy solutions. The export of U.S. law
through a borderless DMCA limits the. policy choices of other jurisdic-
tions, because their local companies and citizens frequently face no
viable alternative but to abide by the U.S. statute, even where it is in-
consistent with local law.
3. Borderless Laws—Domain Names
The aggressive extra-territorial legislative approach is not limited
to copyrights. A similar situation unfolded in the United States in the
domain name sphere in 1999 with the enactment of the Anticyber-
squatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA), which features a unique
72 See Michael Geist, New Net Laws Reach Beyond Bowlers, Gum.  & MAIL, June 27, 2002,
at B17, available at b ttp://www.globeandinail.com/servlet/ArticleNews/printarticle/gani/
20020627/TWGE1S.
78 See id.
74 James Pearce, US Finn Puts Thrssu re on Overseas ISPs, ZDNE. I . UK N ews, Jan. 14, 2003,
at http://news.zrinet.co.tik/story/0.,t269-s2128644,00.1thul.
75 Id.
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in rem jurisdiction provision that almost ensures its extra-territorial
application•"
The provision is designed to address instances in which the plain-
tiff, invariably a trademark holder, is unable to assert traditional per-
sonal jurisdiction principles because the domain name registrant has
no ties to the jurisdiction." The statute grants trademark holders the
right to file a civil action against the domain name itself, which is
treated as property based in the United States because the domain
name root server resides there."
Several commentators have questioned the constitutionality , of
the ACPA's in rem provision," though courts have thus far not hesi-
tated to apply it. For example, the provision surfaced in a dispute be-
tween two Canadian parties over the Technodome.com
 domain
name.80
 Heathmount was a Montreal-based company seeking to de-
velop theme parks in both Canada and the United States.ffl It claimed
trademarks in the name "Technoclome" in both countries. 82 The
owner of the technodome.com
 domain name was a Toronto teenager
who worked at a local theatre company." Heathmount, as the trade-
mark holder, could have launched a trademark infringement action
in Canada where courts have addressed cyberscptatting issues on sev-
eral occasions,fm or it could have initiated an Internet Corporation for
76
 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2) (C) (2000).
77 Id. § 1125(d) (2) (A) (ii); R. Polk Wagner & Catherine T. Struve, Realspace Sovereigns in
Cyberspace: Problems with the Anticybewquatting COliSliflter Protection Act, 17 I3ERKELEY TECO. L.
J. 989, 992 (2002), available at littp://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/pwagner/umgn
 er-strtive_
acpa.pdf.
78 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2) (C). The provision stipulates that "Mlle owner of a mark
may file an in rem civil action against a domain name in the judicial district in which the
domain name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain name authority that regis-
tered or assigned the domain name is located." Id.
79 See generally Wagner & Struve, supra note 77.
86
 Heathmount A.E. Corp. v. Technodome.com , 106 F. Supp. 2d 860 (E.D. Va. 2000),
motion to dismiss denied 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20316 (E.D. Va. 2000), appeal dismissed 2002
U.S. App. LEXIS 475 (4th Cir. 2002).
at Electronic Frontier Foundation, NSI Opposes EFF in Case Seeking Fairness in Where Such
Disputes ore Heard, EFFECTOR, Aug. 3, 2001. at
h ttp:/ /www.eff.o rg/effecto r/HTML/effect 14.1 7.h tml.
82
 Heathmount, 106 F. Supp. Mat 861.
83
 Brief of Appellants at 1, Heathmount, No. 01-1153. 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 475 (4th
Cir. Jan. 10, 2002), available at littp://www.efforg/Cases/Heathmotint_v_Technodome.
com/20010329_appellant_brief.pdf.
61 See Press Release, Electronic Frontier Foundation, EFF Argues Website Case Uti-
fair—A Domain's Home Is Its Local Jurisdiction, Not in Virginia (Dec. 5, 2001), at
lutp://www.eff. org/Cases/Heathmo
 tin t_v_Technodome,com/20011205_eff pr.litml; see
also Saskatoon Star Phoenix Group v. Noton, [20011 206 Sask. R. 106; itrave12000.com
 Inc.
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Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) Uniform Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) action. 85 Instead, it chose to
launch an ACPA action in Virginia. The Toronto teenager had abso-
lutely no connection to Virginia. 89 The trademark owner successfully
invoked the in rein jurisdiction clause by suing the domain name,
rather than its owner. 87
The court considered the propriety of a U.S. court addressing a
suit between two Canadian litigants and concluded:
Plaintiff may not be able to assert the same rights in Canada,
which lacks a body of law equivalent to the ACPA and whose
enforcement of its trademark laws cannot. extend into the
United States. Defendants suggest that Canadian intellectual
property law, drawing upon recent English case law, might
view the registration of a trademark-infringing domain name
as an actionable trademark violation. This outcome is par-
ticularly likely, Defendants argue, in a case like the one at
bar, involving both registration and use of the mark. How-
ever, Defendants' prediction of what the Canadian courts
will do when presented with this issue is necessarily specula-
tive and provides little support for the argument that Canada
is a satisfactory alternative forum for this lawsuit. 88
Although the application of the ACPA in rem jurisdictional
clause might be justified in the Technodome.com case on the grounds
that Heathmount possessed a U.S. trademark, subsequent. decisions
have extended the statute further by allowing claims based on foreign
trademarks and foreign domain name registrations. In Barcelona.com v.
Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, a dispute between the City of
Barcelona and the long-time owner of the Barcelona.com  domain
name, the court ruled that the statute could be applied to the City's
Spanish trademark, concluding that Congress makes no distinction
between U.S. and foreign marks within the statute's text. 89 The court.
v. Fagen, [2001] 197 q .L.R. (4th) 700; Sprint Communications Co. LP v. Merlin Intl
Communications Inc., [20001 197 F.C. 44; Bell Actimedia Inc. v. Piaci, )1999] 166 F.C. 202.
88 Brief of Appellants at 6, 22, Heathrnan at, No. 01-1153, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 475
(4th Cir. Jan. 10, 2002), available at http://www.eff.org/Cases/Heatlimottitt_v_Tech-
nodome.com/20010329_appellant_brief.pdf.
86 Id. at 11.
97 Heath ?Mill at, 106 F. Stipp. 2d. at 863.
Hcatharoa at. 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 475, at 20-22.
99 189 F. Supp. 2c1. 367, 376 (E.D. Va. 2002).
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did concede that "trademark law has historically been governed and
regulated on a national level."90
In Cable News Network v. CNnews.com, another Virginia court re-
moved virtually all limitations on ACPA in rem actions. 91 It held that
because Verisign, a company resident in Virginia, is the exclusive reg-
istry for all top-level ".com" domain names, all ".com" domains are
essentially American and therefore subject to the ACPA, without re-
gard for where the domains were registered or the location of the liti-
gan ts.92
Most recently, a federal court in Virginia ruled that an in rem
ACPA judgment ordering the cancellation of a domain took prece-
dence over a foreign court order blocking the cancellation.° The case
involved a dispute over the globalsantafe.com  domain name." After a
U.S. court invoked the ACPA to order the domain name cancelled,
the registrant responded by obtaining an order from a Korean court
blocking the local registrar from effecting the cancellation. 95 The le-
gal drama then shifted back to the United States, where the court
adopted a "first in time" rule to claim that it was the first to assert ju-
risdiction over the domain name. 96 Based on that analysis, the court.
then ordered Verisign, which maintains the root server, to override
the local registrar by deleting the domain in question from the root
server.97
Given the broad interpretation accorded to the ACPA's in rem
jurisdiction provision by U.S. courts, it is increasingly apparent that
the United States has created a domain name dispute resolution pol-
icy with global application. This creates a significant limitation on the
ability of countries to develop their own domain name policies, be-
cause the ACPA has an effect akin to global law and will remain an
option to potential litigants independent of their national law and
policy.
°° Id.
91 162 F. Supp, 2d. 489,492 (E.D. Va. 2001),
92 See id.
93 Globalsantafe Corp. v. Globalsantafe.com , No. Civ.A.01-1541-A, 2003 	 261772.
at*11-12 (E.D. Va. Feb. 5, 2003).
94 Id. at *1-2.
95 Id. at *1.
" Id. at *10-11.
97 Id. at *1, *12.
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4. Borderless Laws—Privacy
Several countries have adopted privacy legislation that is border-
less in approach. In the United States, the Children's Online Privacy
Protection Act (COPPA) applies to commercial Web sites and online
services directed to, or that knowingly collect information from, chil-
dren under the age of thirteen, and contains no limitation on juris-
dictional applicability. 98 The statute simply renders it unlawful to col-
lect personal information from a child without parental consent. 99
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is vested with responsibil-
ity for enforcing COPPA, and although it has yet to pursue any action
against a foreign-based site, its rule-making guidance leaves no doubt.
that such sites are expected to comply with the statute in their privacy
practices toward children."9 FTC regulations expressly apply to any
Web site operator, which is defined as
any person who operates a website located on the Internet
or an online service and who collects or maintains personal
information from or about the users or visitors to such web-
site or online service, or on whose behalf such information is
collected or maintained, where such website or online serv-
ice is operated for commercial purposes, including any per-
son offering products or services for sale through that web-
site or online service, involving commerce:
(a) Among the several States or with one or more foreign
nations;
(b) In any territory of the United Slates or in the District of
Columbia, or between any such territory and .	 (2) Any
State or foreign nation. 101
The United States is not alone in extending its privacy-law
framework beyond its borders. In May 2002, the European Union's
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party released a document that
assessed the international application of the E.U. data protection law
to personal data processed on the Internet by non-E.U. based Web
sites. 102 The Working Party concluded that E.U. law was designed to
98 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (2000).
99 Id. § 6502.
100 See Children's Online Privacy Protection Ride, 16 C.F.R. § 312.5 (2003); sec also 64
Fed. Reg, 59,888. 59,891-92 (Nov. 3, 1999).
1 ° 1 Sec 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (defining "operator").
102 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Document on Determining the
International Application of E.U. Data Protection Law to Personal Data Processing on the
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apply in an extra-territorial manner. 103 Interestingly, the Working
Party was comforted by the fact that the U.S. had adopted a similar
approach with COPPA.'°4
Having determined that the E.U. law applied to foreign-based
sites, the Working Party examined the ramifications of applying the
law to several commonplace Internet activities. 105 For example, it con-
chided that the placement of a cookie file on computer users' hard
drives was covered by the legislation.i 06 Accordingly, Web site owners
were required to provide users with adequate notice, specifying in
clear terms the information intended to be stored in the cookie,
along with the purpose and the life of the cookie. 1 °7
Australia has also incorporated extra-territorial provisions into its
amended 1998 Privacy Act.'" The law, as amended through Decem-
ber 2001, places privacy obligations on both Australian companies as
well as foreign companies that conduct business in Australia and col-
lect personal information about Australians.w° Conscious of its extra-
territorial approach, the law contemplates the possibility that foreign
companies might face conflicts in meeting compliance requirements
of competing privacy statutes."° In such circumstances, the Australian
law cedes jurisdiction to the foreign company's own jurisdiction."'
5. Borderless Law—Computer Crime
In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and
the growing concern over the use of computer networks for criminal
purposes, it comes as little surprise to find that computer crime legis-
lation is commonly borderless, with national authorities empowered
to apply national criminal legislation against out-of-country activities.
The U.S.A. PATRIOT Act, a mammoth 342-page statute enacted
in the fall of 2001, includes provisions that are expressly extra-
Internet by Non-E.U. Based Websites 2 (May 30, 2002) [hereinafter Article 29 Working
Party], at http://europa.eu.int/coirn/internal_market/en/dataprot/wpdocs/wp56_en .
pdf.
I " Id. at 15.
104 Id. at 4.
ws Id. at 10-13.
I" Id. at 11.
107 Article 29 Working Party, supra note 102. at 11.
108 Privacy Act, 1988, § 5B (Austl.), available at hop://www.privacy.gov.ati/publications
/privacy88.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2003).
I°9
 Id. § 5B(1)—(3).
110 Id. § 5B(1) (Note).
111 Id.
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territorial. 112 The most important such computer crime provision is
section 814, which amends the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act." 3
The amendments enhance the U.S. government's ability to prosecute
hacking and denial of service attacks by expanding the definition of
"protected computer" covered by the legislation)" The new defini-
tion includes "a computer located outside the United States that is
used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or
communication of the United States." 115 The effect of the provision is
to grant. U.S. authorities the statutory right to prosecute foreign-based
computer fraud and abuse under U.S. law, even if the activity in ques-
tion may be lawful within its country of origin.
The United States is not alone in this approach. Singapore's
Computer Misuse Act also contains a provision that expands its appli-
cability outside the country's borders. 116 The Act protects computers
from unauthorized access, modification, interception, and interfer-
ence)" it intentionally features broad applicability, and section 11
states that "the provisions of this Act shall have effect, in relation to
any person, whatever his nationality or citizenship, outside as well as
within Singapore ... [if] ... the accused the computer, program
or data was in Singapore at the material time." 118 This section clearly
extends the statute's reach to out-of-country persons who hack into
Singaporean computer servers or alter Web pages hosted within the
country.
Similarly, Malaysia's Computer Crimes Act, which took effect in
2000, includes extra-territorial provisious."8 The Act is designed to
address three types of computer crimes: (i) unauthorized access to
computer material, 128 (ii) unauthorized modification of computer
112 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 ("USA PATRIOT Act"), Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272.
113 Id. § 814 (amending 18 U.S.C, § 1030 (2000 & West. Stipp. 2002)).
Hi Id. § 814(b) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e) (2)).
115 Id. § 814(d) (1) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e) (2) (8)).
He Computer Misuse Act, 1998. Cap 50A, § 11 (Singapore), available at h ttp://tm pan 1
n .org/ trad o c/groups/ public/ docu men ts/apcity/ un pan 002107.pdf.
HT Id. §§ 3-8.
118 Id. §
119 Computer Crimes Act, 1997, § 9 (Malaysia), available at hup://www,mycert,minios.
my; Government of Malaysia, Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC), Malaysian Cyberlaws, at
http://www.msc.commy/mdc/infrastructure/cyberlaws.asp  (last visited Mar, 24, 2003).
IN Computer Crimes Act, 1997. § 3, 4 (Malaysia).
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material," 1
 and (iii) wrongful communication. 122
 Section 9(1) focuses
on the territorial scope of the Act, providing,
The provisions of this Act shall, in relation to any person,
whatever his nationality or citizenship, have effect outside as
well as within Malaysia, and where an offence under this Act
is committed by any person in any place outside Malaysia, he
may be dealt with in respect of such offence as if it was
committed at any place within Malaysia. 123
In light, of notorious cases such as the global dissemination of the
"Love Bug" virus—which wreaked havoc with computer systems
worldwide but went. largely unpunished due in part to inadequate
computer crime legislation in the Philippines 124—the desire for com-
puter crime legislation that targets perpetrators regardless of location
is understandable. Achieving commonly agreed cybercrime standards,
however, is more challenging than is often acknowledged. For exam-
ple; the recently enacted Council of Europe Cybercrime COEINVII-
tion 125 adopts a very broad definition of cybercrime that includes of-
fences related to copyright, thus leading to the possibility of criminal
action in one jurisdiction against activity that is legal in another) 26
Although certain jurisdictions may be comfortable equating copyright
infringement with cybercrime, it is likely that others will shy away
from that approach, resulting in jurisdictional conflicts over the issue.
6. Borderless Law—Online Gambling
Countries are also increasingly willing to extend their regulatory
authority over online gambling. For example, Australia recently en-
acted the Interactive Gambling Act of 2001, creating a detailed legisla-
tive scheme that regulates Internet gambling sites located outside of
Australia. 127 Given the growing popularity of online gambling in Aus-
tralia, federal legislators believed it was necessary to establish a statute
121 ht. § 5 .
' 22 Id. § G.
123	 § 9,
124 Jane Wakefield, Man Accused of Love Bug Hack Goes Free, ZDNET UK NEWS, Aug. 21,
2000, at hup://news.zdnet.co.uk/story/0 „t269-s2080935,00.1uml.
125 Convention on Cybercrime, 109th Sess., ETS No. 185 (Nov. 23, 2002), at
hup://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/eti/Treaties/Htm1/185.111m.
125
 Id, art. 11.
127 Interactive Gambling Act, 2001, §§ 3, 14 (Mimi.), available at hup://scalepluslaw.
gov.att/cgi-bin/download.pl?/scale/data/pasteact/3/3465.
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that criminalized not only Australians who used online gambling serv-
ices, but also Web sites providing gambling services to Australians,
without regard for location.
Part H of the Act states that it is an offence intentionally to pro-
vide an interactive gambling service with an Australian-customer
link. 128
 The statute treats a gambling service as having an Australian
link if any of its customers are physically present in Australia.' 29 Con-
travention of the provision is cumulative so that a person who pro-
vides an interactive gambling service to an Australian is guilty of a
separate offence with each day the service is available.' 30
 The Act es-
tablishes an exception for those instances in which the gambling serv-
ice was not aware, and could not have ascertained with reasonable
diligence (such as asking for personal data or assessing geolocational
traffic data), that the service was being provided to someone with an
Australian link."'
Although some question Australia's ability to enforce its anti-
online gambling statute against offshore providers, there is little
doubt that Australia has enacted a legislative scheme that counters the
ability of users to interact with foreign Web sites under laws that do
the same. Moreover, in case there was any doubt regarding the stat-
ute's intention, section 14 plainly states that "ritinless the contrary
intention appears, this Act extends to acts, omissions, matters and
things outside Australia."'" Given that many countries have legalized
online gaming,'" it is likely that some offshore gambling sites will find
themselves subject to competing and contrary legal systems—operat-
ing lawfully within their home jurisdiction, yet acting unlawfully un-
der Australian law.
B. The Regulation of Code
Although Lawrence Lessig rightly recognized the regulatory
power of code, he may have underestimated the enthusiasm with
which government would begin to regulate it.'" Lessig called on gov-
ernment. to harness the Internet by pushing the architecture of the
§ 15(1).
"9
 Id. § 8.
13° Id. § 15(2).
131 Id. § 15(3), (4).
"2 Illteractive Gambling Act, 2001, § 14 (Anstl.).
153 See Courtney Macavinta Se Jeff Pelline, Virtual Casinos Bet Big, CNET NEWS.COM , July
11, 1997, at hup://news.com.com/2009-1023-201333.html.
134 Sec LESSIG, supra note 18, at 3-8.
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Internet to facilitate its regulation, 195 and today it has become appar-
ent that. government is responding. If version 1.0 of cyberlaw was
characterized by the power of technology to regulate, a defining fea-
ture of cyberlaw 2.0 is the government regulation of technology. In-
terestingly, the regulation of code has not focused on the architecture
of the Internet. as Lessig anticipated. Rather, government regulation
has centered on network end points, where devices access digital con-
tent, as well as the design and accessibility of Web sites.
In the United States, the proposed Consumer Broadband and
Digital Television Promotion Act, better know as the Hollings Bill, is
the archetypal example of the regulation of code. 136 The Hollings Bill,
which never made it out of committee in the Senate, required the
Federal Communications Commission and the Registrar of Copy-
rights to oversee negotiations between representatives of digital media
device manufacturers, consumer groups, and copyright owners to
reach agreement on security system standards for use in digital media
devices. 137 The resulting security standards would be used to ensure
the secure protection of digital content. 138 Once established, digital
device manufacturers would be prohibited from selling devices that
do not incorporate the standards. 139 Moreover, removing or altering
the security standards from a work would be prohibited without the
prior authorization of the copyright owner. 140
As Lessig argues in The Future of Ideas, his follow-up to Code and
Other Laws of Cyberspace, the danger associated with excessive copyright
control rests not just with the implementation of code that controls
copying but also with the support provided to these controls through
Lessig is specifically referring to the DMCA, which provides an
additional layer of legal protection to copyrights above both the tradi-
tional copyright protection and the technical measures protections."2
115 See id. at 6-7.
116 See Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act, S. 2048. 107th
Cong. (Mar. 22, 2002); Declan McCulloch, What Hollings' Bill Would Do, WIRED NEWS, Mar.
22, 2002, at hop://www.wired.com/news/politics/0.1283,51275,00.html;  see also Declan
McCulloch, Tech Firms Fight Copy-Protection Laws, CNET NEWS, Jan. 23, 2003, at imp://
news,com.com/2100-1023-981882.11tMl.
187 Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act, S. 2048, 107th Cong.
§ 3(a) (Mar. 22, 2002).
"8 See id. § 3(d).
199 Id. § 5.
14° Id. § 6.
141 LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF TIIE COMMONS IN A CON-
NECTED WORLD 179-80 (2001).
142 See 17	 §§ 1201-1204 (2000).
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Thus, it would be unlawful to copy a motion picture, unlawful to by-
pass a DVD's encryption, and unlawful to break that encryption's
code. 143
Similar to the DMCA, the Hollings Bill enhances the protection
of copyrights by using the law to mandate control." 1 If successful, the
Hollings Bill will illustrate how the law can be used to regulate code,
and that success is likely to embolden other policymakers to launch
forays into embedding code with regulation.
Other examples of the regulation of code have garnered less at-
tention. The Workforce Investment Act. of 1998, which included the
Rehabilitation Act Amendments, provided that members of the public
with disabilities seeking information or services from federal agencies
have access to that information in a manner that is comparable with
individuals without disabilities." 5 Moreover, it also required that fed-
eral employees with disabilities enjoy equivalent access to information
as those without disabilities, forcing all private firms that engage in
government procurement. to ensure equal access. 18
The implementation of these requirements necessitated the de-
velopment of new standards for accessing content on the Internet, and
required any agency seeking to procure federal government contracts
to comply with the standard.' 47 As a result, the U.S. government speci-
fied the design and structure of thousands of Web sites by regulating
their code."8
145 See id.
144 See id.; Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act, S. 2048. 107th
Cong. §§ 5. 6 (2002).
145 Sec 29 U.S.C. § 794d (a) (1)(A) (2000).
146 see id .
147 Electronic and Information Technology Accessibility Standards, 36 C.F.R. pt. 1194
(2002); see 29 U.S.C. § 794d.
148 See 36 C.F.R. § 1994. 22 (2003). The regulation includes the following technical
specifications:
(a) A text equivalent for every non-text element shall be provided (e.g., via
slongdesc", or in element content).
(b) Equivalent alternatives for any multimedia presentation shall be synchro-
nized with the presentation.
(c) Web pages shall be designed so that all information conveyed with color is
also available without color, for example from context or markup.
(d) Documents shall be organized so they are readable without requiring an
associated style sheet.
(e) Redundant text links shall be provided for each active region of a server-
side image map.
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The European Union Data Protection Working Party engaged in
a similar exercise in developing regulations for the online automated
processing of personal data. 149 Its recommendations specified privacy-
friendly browser default settings, limitations on the configuration of
cookies, and the elimination of auto-generated forms during software
install processes.ISO Although the recommendations also include sug-
gestions for information disclosure, those related to software and
hardware configurations also move government into the realm of
regulating code.
Although policymakers increasingly appreciate that code regu-
lates, they are also awakening to the corollary—that code can be regu-
lated. Although the regulation of code raises new complications by
blending the policy-making attributes of code with more traditional
(f) Client-side image maps shall be provided instead of server-side image
maps except where the regions cannot be defined with an available geometric
shape.
(g) Row and column headers shall be identified for data tables.
(h) Markup shall be used to associate data cells and header cells for data ta-
bles that have two or more logical levels of row or column headers.
(i) Frames shall be titled with text that facilitates frame identification and
navigation.
(j) Pages shall be designed to avoid causing the screen to flicker with a fre-
quency greater than 2 Hz and lower than 55 Hz.
(k) A text-only page, with equivalent information or functionality, shall be
provided to make a web site comply with the provisions of this part, when
compliance cannot be accomplished in any other way. The content of the
text-only page shall be updated whenever the primary page changes.
(I) When pages utilize scripting languages to display content, or to create in-
terface elements, the information provided by the script shall be identified
with functional text that can be read by assistive technology
(m) When a web page requires that an applet, plug-in or other application be
present on the client system to interpret page content, the page must provide
a link to a plug-in or applet that complies with §1194.21(a) through (I).
(n) When electronic forms are designed to be completed on-line, the form
shall allow people using assistive technology to access the information, field
elements, and functionality required for completion and submission of the
form, including all directions and cues.
(o) A method shall be provided that permits users to skip repetitive naviga-
tion links.
(p) When a timed response is required, the user shall be alerted and given
sufficient time to indicate more time is required.
Id.
149 Data Protection Working Party, Recommendation 1/99 on Invisible and Automatic
Processing of Personal Data on the Internet Performed by Software and Hardware (Feb.
23, 1999), at http://enropa.eu.in t/comm/ ternal_market/en/dataprot/wpdocs/wp17
en it tm.
16° See id.
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government policy of regulating code, these complications are not
necessarily a bad thing. For example, the regulation of code need not.
stop at mandating the inclusion of anti-copying technologies within
all digital devices: it could be extended to require the retention of fair
use rights within the implementation of such technologies, thereby
using regulation of code to maintain the copyright balance. 151
C. The End of Self-Regulation	 -
Government. may have been willing to yield policy-making leader-
ship to the private sector in the mid-1990s, but as the volume of regu-
latory activity highlighted above suggests, cyberlaw regulation has be-
come commonplace. Government typically consults with industry and
consumer groups on their preferred approach, but it is unwilling to
remain silent. on matters of cyberlaw policy.
Nowhere is the shift away front self-regulation more evident than
in the world of Internet. governance. As the Internet blossomed from
a small community of users to a global phenomenon in the mid-
1990s, the governance of the domain name system underwent a simi-
larly dramatic change. Once administered by Jon Postel, a computer
scientist at the University of Southern California, in 1998, the U.S.
government handed over management of domain names to ICANN, a
California nonprofit company. 152 ICANN's initial creation drew inter-
est from a diverse group of stakeholders including Internet users,
domain name registrars, technical groups, and intellectual property
law associations.'" Although each group offered differing perspec-
tives on issues such as domain name dispute resolution and the crea-
tion of new domain name suffixes, there was widespread agreement.
on one key principle: ICANN was to be based on a self-regulatory
model in which the stakeholders governed themselves, free front gov-
ernment interference)"
151
 Sec supra notes 18-37, 134-143 and accompanying text.
152 Milton Mueller, ICANN and Interact Governance: Sorting through the Debris of 'Self-
Regulation', 1 INFO 497, 498. 500 (Dec. 1999), available at http://www.icantwatch.org/ar
chive/inuell.pdf.
153 Id. at 499.
151 Id. at 508-09; sec M. Stuart Lynn, President's Report: ICANN—The Case for Reform
(Feb. 24, 2002), at http://wwmicann.org/general/lynn-reform-proposal-24feb02.1um (last
modified Feb. 27, 2002) ("ICANN's assigned mission ... [is] to create an effective private
sector policy development process capable of administrative and policy management of
the Internet's naming and address allocation systems.").
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Self-regulation was premised on a consensus-based approach in
which policy discussion was open to all, supported by a governance
structure that ensured representation • at the board level for all
stakeholders. 155 This latter goal was to be achieved by allocating half
the board positions among several stakeholder groups, and by com-
pleting the other board seats with online elections, thus enabling
Internet users to elect board representatives on a regional basis. 166
With ICANN currently engaged in major reforms, supporters and
critics alike have begun to look to governments to become more en-
gaged. 157 ICANN supporters want to bring government (and its finan-
cial resources) into the fold by elevating the role government plays on
the ICANN board through the Government Advisory Committee, 158
the body that currently enables government to play a consultative role
within ICANN. 159
ICANN critics, meanwhile, have turned to the U.S. government
to call for a reevaluation of the ICANN mandate. 160 Although the De-
partment of Commerce renewed its Memorandum of Understanding
with ICANN in September 2002, many critics view the U.S. govern-
ment as their best ally in pursuing genuine ICANN reform.m
Just as ICANN and its critics turn to government, governments
have begun to question openly the ICANN approach, suggesting that
more governmental oversight may be needed. For example, U.S.
Senator Conrad Burns announced his intention to introduce new leg-
islation that would give the U.S. government greater influence over
ICANN. 182
 Burns argues that greater influence is needed because
155 Sec Mueller, supra note 152, at 508-09,
156 Sec Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers. March 2000 ICANN
Meeting in Cairo: At Large Membership and Elections, at http://wmv.icanti.org/cairo
2000/atlarge-topic.htm (last modified Oct. 6, 2002).
157 See Lynn, stipm note 154.
158 See Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, The Internet Domain
Name System and the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) of ICANN (Oct. 2001),
at http://uww.icann.org/committees/gac/ontreach-en-OloctOl.htm  (last modified Mar.
24, 2002).
155 See Lynn, supra note 154.
160 See Declan McCullagh, Congress to Enter ICANN Fray, WIRED NEWS, Mar. 14, 2002, at
11 ttp:/ /imw.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,51041,00.huid.
161 See Anick Jesclanun, IC'LVN Gets Another Year, AUSTRALIAN IT, Sept. 23, 2002. at
hitp://austmlianit.news.com.au/articles/0,7204,5148890%5e16123%5e%5enbv%5e,00.11t
nil.
162 Renters, Senate to Scnintize IG(?\' More Closely, STANDARD, Feb. 14, 2001, at http://
www.thestandard.com/article/display/0,1151,22210.00.1itml.
2003]	 Cyber Law 2.0	 353
ICANN has exceeded its authority, does not operate in an open fash-
ion, and is unaccountable to Internet users. 163
Similarly, the European Union has argued that. governments
must. have greater involvement. in public policy issues, recommending
that ICANN always consult governments on policy matters, and that it
should be able to ignore or reverse governmental advice only by a
two-thirds vote of its board. 104 In 2002, a representative from the Legal
Counsel of the United Nations noted how unusual it was to entrust.
domain name governance to a private body rather than to an interna-
tional representative body. 165 He argued that the Internet requires
international cooperation for both its operation and regulation and
that global governmental organizations are uniquely suited to foster
such cooperation, 100
Most recently, the International Telecommunications Union, an
international body in the United Nations system, issued its clearest
signal yet that governments want a larger voice in the Internet gov-
ernance process) 67 Under the title "Internet. Names: A Matter for
Both Government and Private Sector," it approved a resolution on the
management of multilingual domain names that promotes the role of
the government in the internationalization of domain names.'"
A U.S. Congressional proposal to mandate the creation of a "dot-
kids" second-level domain name illustrates how government is also
engaging in Internet governance on the national, country-code level.
The Dot Kids Implementation and Efficiency Act of 2002, passed by
the House of Representatives in May of 2002, requires the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) to es-
tablish a new dot-kids second-level domain within the dot-us country-
165
117" Presidency of the Council of European Union, Preparation of the Trans-
port/Telecommunications Council on 17/18 June 2002—International Management of
the Internet and ICANN Reform 5 (June 3, 2002), at http://register.consilimmemint/
ptif/en/02/st09/09526en2.pdf,
165 Hans Covell, Statement before WIPO Standing Committee on the Law of Trade-
marks, Industrial Designs anti Geographical Indications, Second Special Session on the
Report of the Second WIPO Internet Domain Name Process (May 21-24, 2002), Annex I,
at 2-3, at http://www,thiso.org/clubpublic/council/ArclO/pdf00001.pdf.
166 1d. at 3.
167 International Telecommunications Union, Plenipotentiary Conference 2002 High-
lights, Internet Names: A Matter for Both Government and Private Sector (Oct. 10, 2002)
[hereinafter Conference 2000J, at lutp://www.itu.int/newsroom/pp02/Highlights/1010.
hind. For information on the International Telecommunications Union ("ITU"). see
lutp://wwwitu.int (last visited Mar. 2003),
168 Conference 2000, sup/ note 167.
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code domain. 169 The Act provides that the dot-kids domain allows ac-
cess only to material that is suitable to children under the age of thir-
teen. 17°
Although it is not uncommon for government to play a role in
the management of a country-code domain, mandating the creation
of a new second-level domain is rare."' The legislative proposal illus-
trates how governments worldwide are seeking a more prominent
voice on Internet governance matters, and are no longer content to
adhere to the self-regulatory bargain that envisioned private-sector
led solutions.
Governments are also abandoning self-regulatory solutions in
dealing with unsolicited commercial e-mail or spam. Although the
U.S. Direct Marketing Association only recently altered its position
that self-regulatory measures were sufficient to address concerns re-
lated to spam, 172
 it has been clear for some time that government is
unconvinced by self-regulatory solutions. With spam now accounting
for thirty-eight percent of all e-mail traffic, governments worldwide
have begun to adopt aggressive anti-spam legislative initiatives.'" The
United States has yet to enact federal anti-spam legislation, but dozens
of U.S. states now have anti-spam legislation on the books. 174
 Moreo-
ver, the United States is not alone in the battle against spam, as Ja-
pan,"5
 South Korea,"° and the European Unionl" have all enacted
anti-spam measures in recent months. Although some governments
169
 Dot Kids Implementation and Efficiency Act § 4, 47 U.S.C. § 941 (Lexis 2003).
170 Id.
171
 While some countries, such as Germany and the United Kingdom, have allowed the
private sector to manage the national domain name infrastructure without interference,
ocher countries, such as China, India, and Finland have used the government as the direct
manager with minimal, if any, public participation.
172
 See Declan McCullach, Direct Marketers Want Anti-Span Laws, CNET NEWS.CONI, Oct.
2t, 2001, at hup://news.com.com/2100.1023-962821.html.
171 David Lazarus, Span Indigestion Worsens, S.F. CHRONICLE, Oct. 9, 2002, at Bl, avail-
able at littp://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?ffle=/chronicle/archive/2002/10/09/
BU243115.DTL.
174 See id.; see also Spans Laws: United States: State Laws: Stunmary, SpamLaws.com, at
lutp://www.spamlaws.com/state/summary.html
 (last visited Jan. 31, 2003).
175 Christopher Saunders, Japan Takes Anti-Span Steps, INTERNEINEWS.COM , July 11,
2002, at h ttp://www.in cernetnews.com/ IAR/article.php/ 1402331.
176
 Yang Sung-jin, Powerful Web Site Blocking Spain, KOREA HERALD, Aug. 22, 2002, avail-
able at http://wwwkoreaherald.com/SITE/data/h
 tml_d ir/ 2002/08/ 22/200208220054.
asp.
177 Reuters, EU Sticking to Tough Span Law. WIRED NEWS, Dec. 6, 2001, at http://www.
wired.com/news/politics/ 0,1283,48894,00.1nm].
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profess to remain committed to industry-led anti-spam solutions, 178
the tide is clearly shifting as legislative solutions move to the forefront.
Nowhere is the shift in attitude away from self-regulation more
evident than in the area of e-commerce regulation, where visions of
private-sector-led policy now represent a bygone era. This is particu-
larly true in relation to consumer e-commerce transactions. Govern-
ments have abandoned policies that left these transactions to the pri-
vate bargains of sellers and purchasers, imposing instead new e-
commerce consumer protection measures. For example, the Cana-
dian Province of Manitoba has enacted e-commerce consumer protec-
tion legislation that creates new disclosure requirements for sellers
and provides purchasers with assurances of recourse in the event that
the transaction is not completed as planned. 179
The disclosure requirements include basic information such as
the seller's name, business address, and phone number, as well as de-
tailed descriptions of the goods being purchased, applicable warran-
ties, shipping charges, delivery dates, and refund policies."° The in-
formation can be provided to the buyer via e -mail or posted on the
seller's Web site, so long as the buyer can access it prior to pur-
chase."' The purchaser also has the right to cancel the transaction if
the seller fails to comply with the disclosure requirements or fails to
deliver the goods within thirty clays of the specified delivery date. 182
The new rules also bring credit card issuers into the equation. If
the seller fails to issue a refund after a buyer makes a credit card pur-
chase online and then uses his legal rights to cancel the same transac-
tion, the credit card issuer is required by law to cancel or reverse the
178 Industry Canada, Electronic Commerce Policy, Consumer Protection, Internet and
Bulk Unsolicited Electronic Mail (SPAN!), Conclusion, at lutp://e-comic.gc.ca/english/
links/spandund (last modified Jan. 22, 2003).
178 Consumer Protection Act, C.C.S.M, ch. C200, §§ 121-35 (2003) (Manitoba, Can.),
available at http://web2.gov.mb.ca/laws/statutes/ccsm/c200e.php  (unofficial version).
The Consumer Protection Act was substantially amended to address Internet agreements
by the Electronic Commerce and Information Act, Consumer Protection Amendment and
Manitoba Evidence Amendment Act, S.M., ch. 32, §§ 32-39 (2000) (Manitoba, Can.),
available at lutp://web2.gomb.ca/laws/statutes/2000/c03200e.ph p#36 (unofficial ver-
sion).
For an overview of Manitoba's consumer protection on the Internet, see Bradley J.
Freedman, Electronic Contracts Under Canadian Law—A Practical Guide, 28 MiorrroBA 1.4
48-51, available at h ttp:/ /www.uman itoba.ca/faculties/law/Journal/back_issues/ar dries/
28_1 freedman.pdE
180 Consumer Protection Act, C.C.S.M, ch. C200, § 129(1), 129(2).
181 Id, § 129(1) ("Buyer may cancel if not provided information"), (2) ("Electronic
methods of providing information").
182 Id. § 130(1) ("Buyer may cancel for failure to deliver"), (2) ("Attempted Delivery").
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credit card charge, including any associated interest charges. 183 If the
seller fails to disclose the requisite information to the consumer or
does not meet the delivery deadline, the consumer can seek recourse
through the credit card issuer, who is required to provide a refund. 184
Moreover, sellers simply cannot ignore these issues because the law
itself provides that the rules cannot be avoided or limited by con-
tract—and failure to comply may result in fines or imprisonment. 185
Manitoba is by no means alone in promulgating legislation of this
kind. In Canada, it has been followed by Ontario, which recently in-
troduced similar protections in a consumer protection bill. 18° The
European Union, which also has protections in place, has aggressively
introduced e-commerce consumer protection legislation as part of its
E-Commerce Directive 187 and Distance Selling Directive. 188 Moreover,
Asian countries have proposed limitations on various other aspects of
e-commerce transactions, including restrictions related to online attc-
tions189 and online dating services.'"
In addition to dictating the terms of e-commerce transactions,
government has also intervened by regulating what can be sold on-
line. Several states have enacted restrictions on the online sale of
wine, 181 automobiles, 192
 and cigarettes.'" In fact, some states have cre-
183 Id. § 134(1) ("Buyer's recourse re credit card charges"), (2) ("Credit card issuer
must reverse or cancel charges").
184 Id. § 134(1), (2).
188 Consumer Protection Act, C.C.S.M, ch. C200, § 134(3) ("Application: This section
applies despite any agreement to the contrary entered into before or after this Part comes
into force.").
188 News Release, Ontario Ministry of Consumer and Business Services, Ernie Eves
Government Introduces Bill to Improve Consumer Protection (Sept, 26, 2002), at 11111)1 /
iirww.cbs.gov.on.ca/mcbs/english/SECQ4C.Iiint.
187 See Council Directive 2000/31 of 8 Pine 2000 on Electronic Conunerce. 2000 O.J.
(L 178), available at littp://europa.ett.int/eur4ex/pri/en/oj/dat/2000/1_178/l_17820000
717en00010016.pcif.
185 See Council Directive 97/7 of 20 May 1997 on the Protection of Consumers in Re-
spect of Distance Contracts, 1997 0.1 (L 144), available at http://ettropa.eu.int/comin/
cons timers/ policy/ developmen ts/ dist_sell /d istOl_en .ptlf.
189 E.g.. John Markoff, Auction Sites in Japan Fear Alove to Limit Online Sales.
NViim ts.cost. Feb. 6, 2002, at
/ troo,vmytimes.cona/ 2002/02/06/ technology / 06AUCT. html.
19° E.g...Police Consider Legal Action on Internet Dating Sites, JAPAN TODAY, Oct. 3, 2002, at
http://wwwjapantoday.coin/e/?content=news&cat=2&id=232828.
net E.g., Paul Kanoho, Restrictions on Alcohol Saks on the Internet: Issues of Safety and Free-
dom, INTERNE:1' LJOURNAL.COM , Apr. 16, 2001, at http://www.tilj.com/content/ecomhead-
line04140102.h ttn.
 E.g., Linda Rosencrance, Aulomakeil Sue Arizona Over Online Car Sales, COMPUTER-
WORLD, July 13, 2000, at http://wmv.computerworld.corn/inanagemennopics/ebusiness/
story/0,10801,47090,00.hunl.
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ated limitations on payment processes by questioning the legality of
third-party paythent systems such as PayPa1 194 and by reaching agree-
ments with credit card issuers to deny approval for online gambling
transactions. 195
Government may have once believed that it should not regulate
the Internet and Internet-based activity, but. this is clearly no longer
the case. From macro issues, such as global Internet. governance, to
micro concerns, such as the physical address of online sellers, gov-
ernment. regulation has clearly replaced self-regulation as the cyber-
law regulatory method of choice.
CONCLUSION
Although the three principles of Cyberlaw 1.0 may appear dis-
tinct, they are in fact tied together by one larger principle—that gov-
ernment would not, could not, and should not apply its traditional
regulatory mechanisms to the Internet. The existence of a borderless
Internet and bordered laws implies that governments lacked the
moral authority to apply their rules to people who had not elected
them sovereign. Many of those who focused on the regulatory power
of code did so with the belief that. traditional lawmaking—East Coast
Code in Lessig's parlance—would be unable to regulate activity online
as offline. 196 Government. may well have believed both of these prem-
ises for it enthusiastically adopted industry's mantra that the Internet
was different and that it was ill-equipped to flex its regulatory muscle.
No sooner had these principles been accepted than we find them
being rapidly undermined. In this emerging cyberlaw framework,
government plays the central regulatory role, much as it does for
most offline activities. It is being assisted in this regard by technology,
which is reshaping the Internet to match more closely its real-space
equivalent, complete with borders that mirror those found in a Rand
McNally Atlas.
193 E.g., Todd R. Weiss, Judge Overturns NY Law Banning Online Cigarette Sales, Com-
I' UTER WORLD, j(1111C 8, 2001, at http://www.computerworld.com/managementtopics/
ebusinessistory/0,10801,61255,00.1uml.
194 Michael Liedtke, PayPal Warns its Service is About to Shut Down in Louisiana, Casting
Cloud over IPO, NAPLES DAILY Nnws, Feb. 12, 2002, available at http://www.naplesnews.
com/02/02/business/d745055a.htm.
195 Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Financial
Giant Joins Fight Against Online Gambling (June 14, 2002) (outlining agreement in
which leading credit card issuer Citibank agreed to block key Internet transactions), at
tt1D://wtm.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/jun/jun 1 4a_02.11 tI111.
196 See supra text accompanying notes 36-.37.
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In many respects, the changing cyberlaw environment creates
greater challenges than its predecessor. Private-sector-led policy envi-
sioned the likelihood of policy disputes, but was content to grant pri-
vate parties the room to sort through those disputes through contrac-
tual mechanisms free from government interference. The popularity
of borderless laws escalates these disputes to the international level.
Private parties will still face policy disputes, but they will now be
joined by countries who, burdened by the extra-territorial application
of foreign laws, struggle to assert national sovereignty over policy
choices.
The regulation of code, meanwhile, creates many of the same
concerns as regulation by code. At one level, it transfers the policy
choices embedded in code from industry to government. This is a
more democratic approach that assuages concerns that industry will
act in a self-interested manner at the expense of the general public
interest. Although government may be just as likely to make poor pol-
icy choices, there is some comfort in knowing that the choices are
made by policymakers who are accountable under our system of de-
mocracy in ways that corporate officials are not.
At another level, however, government intervention into code
poses troubling implications for the innovation process. Government.
may be well-suited to represent the concerns of consumers and small
businesses, but many would doubt whether it is equipped to prescribe
Web site specifications, much less mandate the inclusion of new tech-
nologies into consumer products.
The replacement of self-regulatory solutions with more tradi-
tional forms of government lawmaking also creates new concerns. Al-
though the ICANN experiment illustrates how self-regulation risks
rapid devolution into a series of self-interested choices that exclude
the public interest, it is by no means certain that government can or
will make better choices. In fact, government processes may be so slow
as to cause more harm than good. Moreover, the emergence of con-
flicting regulatory rules on all aspects of e-commerce are likely to
cause many companies to forego the benefits of e-commerce, unwill-
ing to bear the burden of a costly regulatory framework.
Although this new version of cyberlaw may indeed present some
difficult policy choices, it is important that these issues be addressed
through the prism of the real, rather than the construct of the per-
ceived. Cyberlaw 2.0 has arrived, bringing with it a shift from a bor-
derless network to borderless law, from code that regulates to code
that is regulated, and from self-regulation to government regulation.
